Ayaj Rana

Publication(s)

• Iyer, D. K., Rana, A., & Litwin, A. S. (2026). "Technology Makers as De Facto Work Designers in American Healthcare." Work and Occupations. In Press. Link

Working Papers 

• Dissertation Paper I: Occupational Evaluability and Professional-Client Power Relations. Can a professional retain power over the client whose rating governs her future work opportunities? Two literatures disagree. Algorithmic control predicts deference to the client, since ratings control future work. Power-dependence theory predicts the opposite where a client cannot assess the deliverable without the professional's reading. This sequential mixed-method paper resolves the tension through a property of the work itself—its external evaluability. In occupations, where the work admits external evaluation, the pressure to protect a high accumulated rating constrains the professional and shifts power to the client. In occupations, where it does not, the same high rating certifies expertise and strengthens the professional's power over the client. A uniform control instrument thus proves conditional.

• Dissertation Paper II: Professional Identity in Algorithmically Mediated Client Work. Identity theory holds that when work context constrains the self-concept, professionals either repair their identity in place or exit, both assuming identity and context are inseparable. Digital talent platforms sever that tie, since the same client can be served on or off the platform. Drawing on interviews, this paper identifies a third response, identity re-siting, in which a professional relocates a client relationship off-platform and rebuilds it on her own terms. This restores her capacity to enact her values, earn recognition, author the work, and grow into new roles. The paper reframes disintermediation, the practice of moving client relationships off the platform, from fee-avoiding marketplace leakage to identity work.

• Dissertation Paper III: Reciprocity, Reputation, and the Locus of Exchange in Triadic Platform Work. A platform's most reputable performers, the very source of its competitive advantage, are more likely to disintermediate. Two theories predict the opposite of each other. Resource dependence treats reputation as a platform-specific asset, worthless elsewhere, so the best should stay. Human capital treats it as portable skill and client trust, so the best should disintermediate. This mixed-methods paper finds that neither holds alone. Instead, the deciding factor is whether the platform kept the promises—meritocratic access, fair dispute resolution, transparent governance, and career support—that drew the professional to its market. The paper extends psychological contract theory to triadic, market-mediated work, recasting talent retention as sustaining reciprocal exchange rather than policing marketplace leakage. 

Select Pre-Ph.D. Publications

• Kamal, M., & Rana, A. (2019). "Do Internal and International Remittances Affect Households’ Expenditure and Asset Accumulation Differently? Evidence from Bangladesh." The Journal of Developing Areas, 53(2), 139–153. Link

• Rana, A., & Kamal, M. (2018). "Does Clientelism Affect Income Inequality? Evidence from Panel Data." Journal of Income Distribution, 27(1), 1–24. Link

• Kamal, M., Rana, A., & Wahid, A. (2018). "Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data." Australian Economic Papers, 57(1), 92–106. Link

• Rana, A., & Wahid, A. (2017). "Fiscal Deficit and Economic Growth in Bangladesh: A Time-Series Analysis." The American Economist, 62(1), 31–42. Link